Section B: Strengthening Funding and Accountability
"When public health works best, it is invisible -- it’s the disease you didn’t get, the accident you didn’t have, the disaster that didn’t happen" is an adage within the public health community.84 After September 11 and the anthrax attacks, it became clear that the nation’s public health system was antiquated, unprepared, and underfunded to respond to modern health threats.85 Public health practitioners have not always been considered “front line” responders, but with increased threats of bioterrorism and pandemic flu, they have been recognized as a central component in emergency threat response.
There are few existing structures or historical examples to build upon. Much of bioterrorism and public health preparedness has necessitated creating systems, technologies, and measures from scratch. To help meet this need, in 2002, Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act, appropriating approximately $1 billion per year to help bolster federal and state preparedness.
1. Strengthening Preparedness Funds
After the initial rounds of funds to support public health preparedness, the programs have already experienced cuts, even before many basic preparedness goals could be met. These cuts threaten to halt or even reverse progress that has been achieved.
Since FY 2004, over $90 million has been cut from CDC preparedness funds allocated to states, and over $23 million has been cut from HRSA funds allocated to states for hospital preparedness. Additionally, some funds originally designated for state preparedness have been “reprogrammed” to other bioterrorism activities, including $27 million in FY 2004 and $52 million in FY 2005 shifted to the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI).
All of these reprogrammed funds are important for preparedness, but funding for new programs should not come at the expense of vital ongoing preparedness activities. Taking funds away from existing state and local preparedness efforts jeopardizes the progress that has been made.
2. Strengthening Accountability
Another public health adage is that “preparedness is a process.” While that is clearly true, and it is impossible to be 100 percent prepared for every possibility, there are basic protections that should be in place in every state and community across the country. Americans rely on their government to protect them from threats that are bigger than any individual or single community can respond to on their own. Other sectors involved in emergency response on a day-to-day basis, including law enforcement, public safety, firefighters, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), hospitals, and the military, have determined “optimally achievable” measures for preparedness.86 The public health preparedness system does not currently have a comparable set of baseline objectives.
Five years after September 11, there is still little information publicly available to evaluate how states’ preparedness capabilities have improved and what vulnerabilities remain. The lack of concrete data has raised concerns among Members of Congress, the GAO, and HHS, as well as independent analysts and watchdog groups. This means Americans do not have information about how well their communities and states are prepared, and do not know whether their tax dollars are being spent efficiently. It also makes it difficult for Congress to know where it should strategically invest limited federal funds to address vulnerabilities and to hold states accountable for their use of these funds.
The CDC and HRSA have gone through a number of iterations toward establishing clear, objective “performance measures” for states. Each year, they have been updated to reflect more of an emphasis on demonstrating capabilities versus developing plans. However, the most recent measures are still viewed as inadequate and have received criticism for focusing on:
- Self-reported information from states that cannot be verified objectively or by external evaluators;
- Releasing data only in aggregate form, rather than on a state-by-state basis, which denies the public and policymakers information about how prepared their communities are and how well the funds are being used;
- Process versus outcomes, such as evaluating time frames for activities rather than the quality and impact of the information; and
- Basic capabilities instead of how a state would be able to cope with a mass emergency when the regular functions would be quickly overwhelmed.
Useful performance standards must include:
- Baseline, "optimally achievable" standards that every jurisdiction shoudl be required to meet;
- Externally or objectively verifiable achievements;
- An emphasis on meeting mass emergency surge needs; and
- Public reporting of the information to citizens and policymakers in every state.
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